On Fully Homomorphic Encryption by Fauzi, Prastudy
On Fully Homomorphic Encryption
Prastudy Fauzi
Master in Security and Mobile Computing
Supervisor: Danilo Gligoroski, ITEM
Co-supervisor: Helger Lipmaa, University of Tartu
Department of Telematics
Submission date: June 2012
Norwegian University of Science and Technology

Problem Description
Name of student: Prastudy Mungkas Fauzi
The student will analyse the most recent developments in fully homomorphic encryp-
tion. The student will start with the basic mathematical concepts used in the latest fully
homomorphic cryptosystems based on learning with errors, and the main ideas common
to these cryptosystems. Later, the student will make a comparison of the latest schemes
and discuss some possible improvements. The student will conclude with some possible
applications of fully homomorphic encryption.
Assignment given : 15 January 2012
Supervisor : Dr. Helger Lipmaa, Prof. Danilo Gligoroski
1
Abstract
In this thesis, we do a survey of the most recent fully homomorphic encryption schemes.
We study some of the latest fully homomorphic encryption schemes, make an analysis of
them and make a comparison. We start with Gentry’s scheme, which was the first fully
homomorphic encryption scheme, and choose four other fully homomorphic encryption
schemes to analyze. We discuss the main ideas of each scheme, and how each scheme
improves upon the previous ones. Whenever possible, we rewrite the main results of
these schemes in a more detailed and readable format.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Problem Statement
Cryptography, generally speaking, is the study of secret writing. As such, one important
aspect of cryptography is encryption, which is the process of converting readable infor-
mation into something unreadable. The readable information is known as plaintext, the
unreadable output is known as ciphertext, and the conversion is done using a so called
encryption algorithm. Encryption requires additional information to perform, which is
known as the encryption key. For encryption to be useful, there must be a way to convert
the ciphertext back to the plaintext. This process is called decryption, and it usually
requires some additional knowledge that only privileged parties have access to, which is
called the decryption key.
The decryption key used in a decryption algorithm may or may not be the same
as the encryption key. When the decryption key is the same as the encryption key,
we have symmetric encryption. When these two keys are different, we have public-key
encryption. There are then two types of cryptography based on the type of encryption
used: symmetric cryptography and public-key cryptography.
Symmetric cryptography is typified by the use of a common key between the sender
and receiver. The most used encryption schemes today in symmetric cryptography are
known to be very efficient, but difficult to break in a short amount of time. However,
symmetric cryptography has some drawbacks. The main challenge is distributing the
common key: the sender and receiver must somehow ensure that they share the same
key, and that in the process of sharing this key no other party knows anything about
it. This will be true for every pair of parties who want to communicate, meaning every
party will also have to store many common keys. For security reasons, a common key is
used for only a short amount of time, usually called one session.
Public-key cryptography, meanwhile, uses two different keys: a public key and the
secret key. A public key is published by a party who wants to receive a message, and
has the corresponding secret key that no one else knows. The public key and secret key
are mathematically related in such a way that even if a party knows another party’s
public key, finding out the corresponding secret key is extremely difficult. The main
advantage of public key cryptography is that key distribution is very easy. A party only
7
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has to publish his public key to a common server that all parties trust, and anyone who
wants to communicate simply uses this public key to send messages. However, public
key encryption schemes are much less efficient than symmetric encryption schemes.
Encryption started out as a tool used mainly for military purposes, that is to send
secret messages containing military information. Over time, it has been used much more
widely. We use encryption very frequently in everyday life, from doing transactions with
our favourite bank, to communicating privately with other individuals using email or
instant messaging. One interesting use of encryption is in cloud computing. At a glance,
it seems to be a very convenient way to store data and use cloud services to make use of
the data. However, current implementations of cloud computing require a user to trust
the cloud provider, who can get access to a user’s private data if required. Storing the
data in an encrypted form does not help, as the cloud service will not be able to do most
of its operations on encrypted data without decrypting it first. If it were possible to store
the data in an encrypted form while still enabling the cloud services to do operations on
it, this trust requirement could be removed. Fully homomorphic encryption is a way of
solving this challenge.
Fully homomorphic encryption is an encryption scheme where a party can receive
encrypted data and perform arbitrary operations on this data efficiently. The data
remains encrypted throughout, but the operations can be done regardless, without having
to know the decryption key. Such a scheme would be very advantageous, for example in
ensuring the privacy of data that is sent to a third-party service. This is in contrast with
schemes like Paillier [Pai02] where you can not perform a multiplication of encrypted
data without decrypting the data first, or ElGamal [Gam84] where you can not perform
an addition of encrypted data without decrypting the data first.
Fully homomorphic encryption is a very new area of research: the first such scheme
was constructed by Gentry [Gen09] in 2009. Gentry’s scheme used ideals over polynomial
rings, with security related to that of ideal lattices. Gentry’s idea consists of two parts.
First, define addition and multiplication on the ciphertext, in this case ordinary addition
and multiplication over a polynomial ring. This will create a somewhat homomorphic
scheme, which can evaluate circuits of additions and multiplications up to a certain depth.
However, every multiplication operation increases the noise by a significant amount,
meaning that at some point the noise will be too big. The second idea tries to solve this
by doing noise reduction. Gentry modified his scheme to be bootstrappable, that is it can
evaluate its own decryption circuit. He then showed that any somewhat homomorphic
scheme that is bootstrappable can be changed into a fully homomorphic scheme, as by
the use of bootstrapping, the noise in any ciphertext can be reduced to be the same noise
of evaluating the decryption circuit.
Since Gentry’s breakthrough, there have been many advances inspired by Gentry’s
work. The latest fully homomorphic encryption schemes use public key cryptography
and are based on lattices. Lattice-based cryptography is gaining more interest due to
its security against quantum computers, and its worst case security guarantee. However,
the main problem remains: the schemes do not yet have an efficient implementation that
still maintains adequate security requirements. Seen in this light, recent advances in fully
homomorphic encryption either improves the efficiency of previous schemes, or proposes
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a new scheme with better efficiency.
1.2 Outline
The work in this thesis consists of three parts. First, we will look at the preliminary
knowledge required to understand the later sections on fully homomorphic encryption.
We start with definitions on algebraic number theory, lattice theory, and public key
encryption. We then move to an important security assumption named learning with
errors. Learning with errors is a lattice-based security assumption introduced in [Reg05],
and it can be shown to be related to the hardness of the shortest vector problem in lattice
theory.
Second, we will discuss in detail the most recent fully homomorphic encryption
schemes. The main elements that will be analyzed here are the use of learning with
errors and its variant ring-learning with errors, and techniques such as key switching
and modulus reduction. We will also show how each scheme improves upon the previous
schemes that we have discussed.
One work we start with is the scheme of Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan [BV11],
which improves upon Gentry’s scheme by the introduction of relinearization and mod-
ulus switching, removing the need of a squashing step. We continue with the scheme
of Brakerski, Gentry, and Vaikuntanathan [BGV12], which improves upon Brakerski
and Vaikuntanathan’s scheme by having a general scheme that can be used both in the
learning with errors setting, or its ring variant, and by improving the relinearization and
modulus switching techniques to obtain fully homomorphic encryption without boot-
strapping. We will then continue with Brakerski’s scheme [Bra12], which uses Regev’s
LWE-based scheme under the invariant perspective, and modulus switching is not re-
quired. Finally, we focus on Fan and Vercauteren’s scheme [FV12], that implements
Brakerski’s scheme in the ring learning with errors setting, improving its efficiency.
Apart from Gentry’s scheme, the schemes that we choose to discuss are very new.
Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan’s scheme [BV11] was published in October 2011, Brak-
erski, Gentry, and Vaikuntanathan’s scheme [BGV12] was published in January 2012,
while both Brakerski’s work [Bra12] and Fan and Vercauteren’s work [FV12] are still
only available as eprints.
Third, we will analyze and compare the bounds, size and complexity of the chosen
schemes. A discussion of possible improvements for future work, and a look of possible
applications of fully homomorphic encryption will also be included.
1.3 Author’s Contribution
This work acts as a survey of the most recent fully homomorphic encryption schemes.
We study some of the latest fully homomorphic encryption schemes, make an analysis
of them and make a comparison. Whenever possible, we rewrite the main results of
these schemes in a more detailed and readable format. This includes the proof of Lemma
3.4.1, Lemma 3.4.2, Lemma 3.5.1, Lemma 3.5.2, and Lemma 3.6.1, the observations of
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the performance for each of the schemes, and the comparison of the schemes. We hope
this work can help readers be up to date with the field of fully homomorphic encryption,
paving way to further advances in the field.
For the author, this work will serve as a foundation for ongoing and future work.
One direction we are working on is finding a tighter bound for the expansion factor than
those used in [BGV12]. This will be discussed in Section 4.1. Another way to proceed
is to go deeper into the idea of batching, which will be discussed in Section 4.2. A third
way is to improve the bounds given in [FV12], which is the most recent result we focus
on in this work.
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
Before we go into the encryption schemes, we will give an overview of the mathematical
concepts used in the later sections. This will mostly consist of definitions in algebraic
number theory and lattice theory, then continue with learning with errors and its ring
variant.
2.1 Basic Definitions
2.1.1 Elementary Number Theory.
Let n, x be positive integers. The division algorithm states that there are unique integers
a, b such that
x = an+ b,with− n
2
< b ≤ n
2
.
If b = 0, we say that n divides x, and that n is a divisor of x. If x has no divisors except
1 and x itself, we say that x is prime.
Define [x]n = b, where b ∈ Zn satisfies the above requirement. Moreover, if we have
values c = (c1, · · · , ck) with c1, . . . , ck ∈ Z, define
[c]q = ([c1]q, . . . , [ck]q) = (c
′
1, . . . , c
′
k),with−
q
2
< c′i ≤
q
2
.
Let a be a real number. Then we define three operations below:
• Define the floor function bac to be the largest integer which is not larger than a.
This is also known as the integer part of a.
• Define the ceiling function dae to be the smallest integer which is not smaller than
a.
• Define the round function bae to be the closest integer to a.
For example, b1.49c = b1.49e = 1, and d1.51e = b1.51e = 2.
Given two integers a, b not both zero, we define the two operations below:
• Define the greatest common divisor of a and b, denoted gcd(a, b), to be the largest
positive integer that divides both a and b.
11
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• Define the lowest common multiple of a and b, denoted lcm(a, b), to be the smallest
positive integer that is both a multiple of a and a multiple of b.
For example, gcd(9, 12) = 3, gcd(2, 7) = 1, lcm(9, 12) = 36, and lcm(2, 7) = 14.
When gcd(a, b) = 1, we say that a and b are relatively prime. For example, 2 and 7
are relatively prime, but 9 and 12 are not relatively prime.
For a positive integer n, define Euler’s totient function φ(n) to be the number of
positive integers not greater than n but relatively prime to n. For example, 6 is relatively
prime to 1 and 5, but not relatively prime to 2, 3, 4, or 6, so φ(6) = 2.
We will present two theorems related to the totient function, which will be used in
later sections. The first one is useful to compute φ(n), while the second one is useful to
simplify modular exponentiation.
Theorem 2.1.1 Let n be a positive integer which can be written as n = pa11 · pa22 · · · pakk ,
where p1, p2, . . . , pk are the k distinct prime factors of n. Then we have
φ(n) = n · (1− 1
p1
) · (1− 1
p2
) · · · (1− 1
pk
).
Theorem 2.1.2 (Euler’s Theorem) Let n, a be positive integers which are relatively
prime. Then
aφ(n) ≡ 1 (mod n).
For a positive integer n, define the Carmichael function λ(n) to be the smallest
positive integer m such that
am ≡ 1 (mod n).
for an integer a relatively prime to n.
Carmichael’s theorem is a way to easily compute λ(n).
Theorem 2.1.3 (Carmichael’s Theorem) Let n be a positive integer. Then
λ(n) = φ(n), n = 2, 4, pk, 2pk, p odd prime,
λ(n) =
1
2
φ(n), n = 2k, k ≥ 3, and
λ(lcm(a, b)) = lcm(λ(a), λ(b)).
2.1.2 Algebraic Structures.
A group (G,+) is an algebraic structure where:
1. The operation (+) is closed and associative in G,
2. There exists an identity element 0 ∈ G and inverse element −a for each element
a ∈ G.
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If the operation (+) is also commutative, we say that (G,+) is an abelian group. For an
integer n and an element g ∈ G, define ng to be the result of:
• g + g + · · ·+ g (n times), when n > 0,
• (−g) + (−g) + · · ·+ (−g) (−n times), when n < 0, or
• 0, when n = 0.
If every element a ∈ G can be written as a = ng for some n ∈ Z, we say that (G,+) is a
cyclic group. In this case, g is said to be a generator of the group.
A ring (R,+, ·) is an algebraic structure that satisfies the following conditions:
1. (R,+) is an abelian group.
2. (R, ·) is associative.
3. The distributive laws apply to (R,+, ·).
We usually work with rings which are commutative and have an identity element under
the operation (·).
Given a ring (R,+, ·), a subset I of R is called an ideal if it satisfies the following
conditions:
1. (I,+) is a subgroup of (R,+).
2. For any two elements x ∈ I, r ∈ R, x · r ∈ I and r · x ∈ I.
For example, in the ring R = Z, the ideal I = 2Z is the set of even integers.
Given a ∈ R and an ideal I, we can define the equivalence class
[a] = {a+ x|x ∈ I}.
Then [a] = [b] ⇐⇒ a − b ∈ I. The set of all distinct equivalence classes is the
quotient ring R/I. For example, in the ring R = Z, with ideal I = 2Z, the quotient
ring R/I = Z/2Z has two equivalence classes [0] = {. . . ,−4,−2, 0, 2, 4, . . .} and [1] =
{. . . ,−3,−1, 1, 3 . . .}.
A field (F,+, ·) is a commutative ring which under (·) has an identity element and
inverses. (F,+, ·) is a field iff (F,+) and (F − {0}, ·) are both abelian groups and the
distributive laws apply. We will mostly use the fields Zq (where q is a prime number) and
GF(2) (the Galois field of two elements), which is mostly used for studying arithmetic
circuits with operations XOR and AND. Here, XOR is associated with the addition
operator, while AND is associated with the multiplication operator.
A polynomial ring F [X] is a ring formed from a set of polynomials in the variable X,
where the coefficients are from a field F . If f(X) = adX
d + · · ·+ a1X + a0 ∈ F [X] is an
irreducible polynomial, we have the quotient ring R = F [X]/(f(X)). Moreover, when F
is the field Zq we write Rq = Zq[X]/(f(X)). Additionally, if we have that f has degree
d, then |Rq| = qd.
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2.1.3 Inner Products.
Let V be an n-dimensional vector space over a field F. For a = (a1, . . . , an)
T , b =
(b1, . . . , bn)
T ∈ V , define the inner product
〈a, b〉 =
n∑
i=1
aibi.
We will mostly use the polynomial ring R[x] = Zq[x]/(f(x)), where f is a monic polyno-
mial (polynomial with leading coefficient 1) with degree d. In this case,
a =
d−1∑
i=0
aix
i, b =
d−1∑
i=0
bix
i.
2.1.4 Norms.
Let s =
d∑
i=0
six
i be an element of a polynomial ring R. Define the Euclidean norm
‖s‖2 =
√√√√ d∑
i=0
s2i ,
and the infinity norm
‖s‖∞ = maxi|si|.
Also, for x ∈ Rn, we define the `1-norm
`1(x) =
n∑
i=1
‖xi‖2.
We will be using norms in many of the inequalities in this work. For that reason, we
will give two well-known inequalities related to norms that we will be using often in the
following sections.
Theorem 2.1.4 (Triangle Inequality) Given two vectors a, b of the same size, we have
that
‖a+ b‖ ≤ ‖a‖+ ‖b‖.
Theorem 2.1.5 (Cauchy-Schwarz) Given two non-zero vectors a, b of the same size,
we have that
|〈a, b〉| ≤ ‖a‖‖b‖,
where equality holds if and only if a = kb for some scalar k.
2.1.5 Expansion Factor.
Let R be a polynomial ring. The expansion factor of R is defined as
γR = max{ ‖a · b‖2‖a‖2‖b‖2 : a, b ∈ R}.
When R = Z[x]/(xd + 1), we can prove using Cauchy-Schwarz that γR ≤
√
d.
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2.1.6 Negligible Functions.
A function f : N → R is negligible if for every positive integer c there exists an integer
N = N(c) such that for all x > N ,
|f(x)| ≤ 1xc .
We usually denote negligible functions as negl(x).
2.2 Definitions from Lattice Theory
Lattice theory is a study of mathematical structures called lattices. They have many
interesting applications in cryptography, and as we will see, some lattice problems have
convenient properties in terms of complexity.
2.2.1 Lattice.
A lattice is a set of points in n-dimensional space with a periodic structure. As such, it
is a discrete subgroup of Rn under addition of vectors in Rn.
Let b1, b2, · · · , bk be k linearly independent vectors in Rn. Then we can define the
lattice generated by these vectors as
L(b1, b2, · · · , bk) = {
∑
aibi|ai ∈ Z}
By this definition, {b1, b2, · · · , bk} form a basis of this lattice, which has dimension k.
Every lattice has a basis, but this basis is not unique. For example, if {b1, b2} is a basis
of a lattice L in R2 then {b1, b1 + b2} is also a basis of L. In general, if B is a basis of
a lattice L of dimension n, and Un×n is an integer matrix of determinant 1, then BU is
also a basis of L.
A cryptographic construction using lattices can have strong provable security guar-
antees based on the worst-case hardness of lattice problems. This is done by having
parameters chosen such that breaking the construction is as hard as solving lattice prob-
lems in the worst case [MR08]. One of the most efficient ones are cryptosystems based
on learning with errors, which will be discussed later.
2.2.2 Shortest Vector Problem.
One important property of a lattice is the length of the shortest non-zero vector v ∈ L,
denoted as λ1(L). Here we use the Euclidean norm ‖ · ‖2
This leads to the shortest vector problem (SVP): Given a lattice L with basis B =
(b1, b2, · · · , bk), find a vector v ∈ L such that v = λ1(L).
The hardness of SVP depends on the basis used. One algorithm that approximate a
solution for SVP is the LLL algorithm. The strength of LLL is that it runs in polynomial
time, but with a good choice of a basis, the LLL algorithm may reach errors of up to an
exponential factor 2O(n), where n is the dimension of the lattice [MR08].
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Figure 2.1: 2-dimensional lattice with base {(1, 0), (12 , 12
√
3)}
2.2.3 GapSVP.
Another problem related to SVP is to determine whether the length of the shortest non-
zero vector in L is at most 1 or larger than β > 1. This is known as GapSV Pβ: Given a
basis B = (b1, b2, · · · , bk) of a lattice L, decide whether λ1(L) ≤ 1 or λ1(L) > β.
SVP and GapSVP are NP-hard problems, and no efficient quantum algorithm has yet
been found that solves these problems or approximates them with a small error [MR08].
2.3 Learning With Errors
Suppose we want to get values of the form (a, b) ∈ Zn+1q , where a ∈ Znq , b ∈ Zq. Consider
the two distributions below:
1. Select random values (ai, bi) uniformly from Zn+1q .
2. Uniformly choose s ∈ Znq . Select random ai uniformly from Znq and ei ∈ Zq from
some distribution χ over Zq. Set bi = 〈ai, s〉+ ei ∈ Zq. Give the values (ai, bi).
The learning with errors assumption LWEn,q,χ states that given samples from the second
distribution, we cannot approximate the value of s. A variant of this problem, the
decision learning with errors assumption DLWEn,q,χ states that these two distributions
are indistinguishable. Regev [Reg05] proved that by choosing correct parameters n, q, χ,
LWEn,q,χ is as hard as the shortest vector problem, and that LWE and DLWE are
equivalent provided that the prime q is bounded by a polynomial in n.
2.4 Ring Learning With Errors
We will use the variation of ring learning with errors (RLWE) used in [BGV12]. Let
λ be the security parameter, and f(x) = xd + 1 where d = d(λ) is a power of 2. Let
q = q(λ) ≥ 2 be an integer satisfying q ≡ 1 mod d. Let R = Z[x]/(f(x)) and let
Rq = R/qR. Let χ = χ(λ) be some distribution over R.
Consider the two distributions below:
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1. Sample values (ai, bi) uniformly from R
2
q .
2. Uniformly choose s ∈ Rq. Sample ai uniformly from Rq and ei ∈ R from χ. Set
bi = ai · s+ ei ∈ Rq. Give the values (ai, bi).
The ring learning with errors assumption RLWEd,q,χ states that these two distributions
are indistinguishable. The importance of the RLWE comes from the fact that by choosing
B = ω(
√
d log d) and χ that outputs elements of R with length at most B (except for a
negligible probability), the worst case shortest vector problem over ideal lattices, which
are lattices corresponding to ideals I of polynomial ring R, can be reduced to RLWE
[LPR10].
LWE is the more standard assumption and is a harder problem than RLWE, but
RLWE can be shown to be more efficient [LPR10]. Notice that LWE uses elements in
Zn+1q , but RLWE only uses elements in R2q . This means that RLWE uses smaller keys,
and arithmetic in Rq is more efficient.
2.5 Public Key Cryptosystem
A public key cryptosystem consists of three elements: key generation, encryption, and
decryption.
• Key generation is the process of generating a public key and secret key pair for
encryption and decryption. It requires a security parameter λ, typically the size of
the resulting public key.
• Encryption is the function that maps a plaintext into a ciphertext, using a public
key. The domain of this encryption function is called plaintext space.
• Decryption is the function that maps a ciphertext back into plaintext, using a secret
key.
A public key cryptosystem with a key generation algorithm KG, encryption algorithm
E and decryption algorithm D can then be written as (KG,E,D).
2.6 Probabilistic Encryption
A probabilistic encryption scheme is an encryption scheme which introduces randomness
in the encryption algorithm. This is done so that encrypting the same message more
than once will result in different ciphertexts, making it difficult to detect two different
encryptions of the same message. The randomness factor introduced in the encryption of
a particular message is often called the noise. We define Epk(m; r) to be an encryption of
a message m using the encryption algorithm E and public key pk, with noise parameter
r.
For a probabilistic public key cryptosystem (KG,E,D) and adversary A, and let λ
be the security parameter. Consider the following two games:
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1. Game 1:
• Set (pk, sk) ← KG(1λ).
• Get (m1,m2) ← A(pk).
• Output Epk(m1; r) for random noise r.
2. Game 2:
• Set (pk, sk) ← KG(1λ).
• Get (m1,m2) ← A(pk).
• Output Epk(m2; r) for random noise r.
(KG,E,D) is indistinguishable under chosen plaintext attack (IND-CPA) if for all ad-
versaries A running in polynomial time, there is no way to distinguish between these
two games except with negligible probability. That is, for all adversaries A and security
parameter λ, there exists a negligible function f such that:
|Pr[A = 1 : Game 1]− Pr[A = 1 : Game 2]| ≤ f(λ).
2.7 Homomorphic Encryption
We will give the definition of homomorphic encryption under addition and multiplication,
and show two schemes that do not quite match the criteria: homomorphic under one
operation but not the other.
2.7.1 Definition
Let the plaintext space P have ”addition” operator + , and ”multiplication” operator
×, and let the ciphertext space C have ”addition” operator ⊕ , and ”multiplication”
operator ⊗. Let E : P → C be a probabilistic encryption scheme, and D : C → P the
corresponding decryption scheme.
A public key cryptosystem (KG,E,D) is homomorphic under addition and multiplica-
tion, if
D(E(a)⊕ E(b)) = a+ b
and
D(E(a)⊗ E(b)) = a× b
for all a, b ∈ P .
In general, an encryption scheme homomorphic under addition and multiplication
has a homomorphic evaluation function f : Cn → C that when decrypted will result
in a corresponding function g : Pn → P where D(f(c1, · · · , cn)) = g(p1, · · · , pn) with
ci = E(pi), and g is f with ⊕ replaced by +, ⊗ replaced by ×.
Typically, we use a public key encryption scheme with public key pk and secret key
sk, and the evaluation function f might also need an evaluation key evk. These keys are
generated by a key generator (pk, sk, evk)← KG(1λ), where λ is the security parameter.
In this case, the encryption function is Epk : P → C.
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2.7.2 Homomorphic Under Addition: Paillier
Paillier is a public key cryptosystem that relies on the Decisional Composite Residuosity
Assumption (DCRA) [Pai02]: given a composite integer n and integer x ∈ Zn2 , it is hard
to decide whether or not there is a y ∈ Zn2 such that
x ≡ yn (mod n2).
Key generation in Paillier is as follows:
1. Generate distinct prime numbers of the same size p, q, and let n = p · q. Ensure
that n is an integer where DCRA holds.
2. Set λ = lcm(p− 1, q − 1). The public key is n.
3. For the corresponding secret key, compute, µ = λ−1 mod n The secret key is
(λ, µ).
To encrypt a message m ∈ Zn, we do the following:
1. Select a random r ∈ Z∗n.
2. Output the ciphertext E(m; r) = (n+ 1)mrn mod n2.
Under the DCRA assumption, this scheme is IND-CPA secure.
To decrypt a ciphertext c ∈ Z∗n2 , simply compute m = L(cλ mod n2) · µ, where L
is the discrete logarithm function. In Paillier, this function can be simplified as L(u) =
bu−1n c. Decryption works, because due to Carmichael’s Theorem,
λ(n2) = lcm(λ(p2), λ(q2))
= lcm(p2 − p, q2 − q)
= pq · lcm(p− 1, q − 1)
= n · λ.
So by definition rn·λ ≡ 1 (mod n2). So we have
L(cλ mod n2) · µ = L((n+ 1)m·λ · rn·λ mod n2) · µ
= L((n+ 1)m·λ mod n2) · µ
= m · λ · µ
≡ m (mod n).
Note that if we have two ciphertexts E(m0; r0) and E(m1; r1) which are encryptions
of m0,m1 respectively, then
E(m0; r0) · E(m1; r1) ≡ ((n+ 1)m0r0n) · ((n+ 1)m1r1n)
≡ (n+ 1)m0+m1(r0 · r1)n
≡ E(m0 +m1; r0 · r1) (mod n2).
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Then D(E(m0; r0) ·E(m1; r1)) = m0 +m1. So Paillier is an additively homomorphic
scheme: given encryptions of m0 and m1, we can get an encryption of m0 +m1 without
having to know the secret key. However, given encryptions of m0 and m1 there is no
known way of obtaining an encryption of m0 ·m1 without knowing m0 or m1 first. So
Paillier is not known to be homomorphic under multiplication.
2.7.3 Homomorphic Under Multiplication: ElGamal
ElGamal [Gam84] is a public key cryptosystem that relies on the hardness of the deci-
sional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem [Bon98]: Let G be a group with generator g. Then
it is hard to distinguish between the distributions 〈ga, gb, gab〉 and 〈ga, gb, gc〉 where a, b, c
are integers chosen randomly from [1, |G|]
Key generation in ElGamal is as follows:
1. Let G be a cyclic group with prime order q, where the DDH assumption holds.
2. Let g be a generator of G chosen randomly from Z∗q .
3. Generate the secret key s← Zq, and the public key h = gs.
To encrypt a message m ∈ G, we do the following:
1. Select a random r ← Zq.
2. Compute c1 = g
r.
3. Compute c2 = m · hr.
4. Output E(m; r) = (c1, c2).
Under the DDH assumption, this scheme is IND-CPA secure [Bon98].
To decrypt a ciphertext c = (c1, c2), compute m = D(c) = c2 · (cs1)−1. Decryption
works, because
c2 · (cs1)−1 = (m · hr) · (gr)−s
= (m · hr) · (gs)−r
= (m · hr) · h−r
= m.
Note that if we have two ciphertexts E(m0; r0) and E(m1; r1), then
E(m0; r0) · E(m1; r1) = (gr0 · gr1 , (m0 · hr0) · (m1 · hr1))
= (gr0+r1 , (m0 ·m1) · hr0+r1)
= E(m0 ·m1; r1 + r2).
Then D(E(m0; r0) · E(m1; r1)) = m0 ·m1. So ElGamal is a multiplicatively homo-
morphic scheme: given encryptions of m0 and m1, we can get an encryption of m0 ·m1
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without having to know the secret key. However, given encryptions of m0 and m1 there
is no known way of obtaining an encryption of m0 +m1 without knowing both m0 and
m1 first. So ElGamal is not known to be homomorphic under addition.
Chapter 3
Recent Developments
This section will discuss the latest fully homomorphic encryption schemes, and a com-
parison of complexities for these schemes. We will start with Gentry’s scheme and his
bootstrapping theorem, how bootstrapping could reduce noise and how this theorem was
a blueprint for later results, until schemes were found that did not require bootstrapping.
3.1 Fully Homomorphic Encryption
We will use the definitions in [BV11]. A scheme is somewhat homomorphic if it can
achieve homomorphism under addition and multiplication, without doing any noise re-
duction, i.e., without any process of reducing the size of the noise relative to the size of
the ciphertext.
An encryption scheme is compact if there exists a polynomial (over the security
parameter λ) p = p(λ) such that the output of the evaluation function is at most p bits
long, regardless of f or the number of inputs.
Moreover, an encryption scheme is fully homomorphic if it is compact and homomor-
phic for all arithmetic circuits over GF(2).
3.2 Gentry’s Scheme [Gen09]
Gentry’s scheme used an ideal I of a ring R, where the noise e is chosen to be an element
in I, so that it has the form e = rI for some r ∈ R. This means that the message m
is encrypted to m + rI, and decrypting is the process of getting rid of the ideal. The
homomorphic properties can be seen from the fact that if c1 = m1+r1I and c2 = m2+r2I,
then
c1 + c2 =(m1 +m2) + (r1 + r2)I
c1c2 =(m1 + r1I)(m2 + r2I) = (m1m2) + (m1r2 +m2r1 + r1r2I)I.
Notice that after addition, the noise is (r1 + r2)I, while after multiplication the noise is
dominated by r1r2I. This means that addition approximately doubles the noise, while
multiplication approximately squares the noise. After a number of operations, the noise
will overwhelm the ciphertext and make decryption incorrect. Gentry solved this problem
22
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by evaluating the decryption function homomorphically with the ciphertext as input,
which will create an equivalent ciphertext which has a small noise again. This is known
as bootstrapping, and requires that the decryption function to be efficient, with the
decryption circuit as simple as possible.
Gentry’s scheme relied on the hardness assumptions on ideal lattices. The main
drawback here is that the field of ideal lattices has not been very well studied. Also,
there is a need for a squashing step to reduce the decryption complexity, but requires an
additional strong assumption, that is the sparse subset-sum assumption: given a big set
of integers S, a modulus M and a target sum t, it is difficult to find a sparse subset of
S that sums up to t (mod M). However, his work is very significant because it was the
first scheme proved to be fully homomorphic, and because of his bootstrapping theorem
[Vai11].
A homomorphic encryption scheme E is bootstrappable if it can evaluate its own
decryption circuit, and slightly augmented versions of it. A PKE scheme is weakly
circular secure if it is IND-CPA secure even for an adversary with additional information
containing encryptions of all secret key bits {E(ski)}, where ski is the i-th bit of the
secret key sk. Gentry’s theorem states that if E is bootstrappable and the PKE is weakly
circular secure, then E can be modified into a fully homomorphic encryption scheme.
This method of starting from a somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme and
applying the bootstrapping theorem became a blueprint for many of the subsequent
schemes.
3.3 Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan’s Scheme [BV11]
3.3.1 Overview
The scheme uses relinearization to make it somewhat homomorphic. The noise is man-
aged by modulus switching discussed below. The scheme is then shown to be bootstrap-
pable which turns it into a fully homomorphic encryption scheme.
The most significant development of [BV11] compared to Gentry’s scheme is the use
of well-known security assumptions based on DLWE, and the introduction of the relin-
earization and modulus switching techniques. Modulus switching in particular removes
the need of the expensive squashing step used in Gentry’s scheme.
3.3.2 Encryption Scheme
Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan define an LWE-based public key encryption scheme as
follows. Let λ be the security parameter, n be a positive integer polynomial in λ, k
be a positive integer polynomial in n, and q an odd number sub-exponential in n. Let
χ be a noise distribution that produces small numbers. We have the secret key s =
(s[1], · · · , s[n]) ∈ Znq and public key (A,v = As+ 2e) where A is a k× n matrix chosen
uniformly from Zk×nq and e is chosen uniformly from χk.
j
Suppose m ∈ {0, 1} is the bit we want to encrypt. To encrypt, we do the following:
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1. Select a random r ∈ {0, 1}k.
2. Compute a = ATr and b = vTr +m.
3. Output (a, b).
The ciphertext is an element in Zn+1q generated the same way as the distribution we
have seen in Section 2.3. on learning with errors. Thus according to DLWEn,q,χ (where
χ is a uniform distribution over Zq), we can use this scheme a polynomial number of
times with negligible probability that an adversary can guess s.
To decrypt a ciphertext (a, b), we do the following:
1. Compute b′ = b− 〈a, s〉 = 2e+m ∈ Zq for some noise e.
2. Output m = b′ mod 2.
Decryption works because
b− 〈a, s〉 = (vTr +m)− (aTs)
= (vTr +m)− (vTr − 2eTr)
= 2eTr +m
so taking this value modulo 2 results in m.
3.3.3 Ideas
3.3.3.1 Relinearization (Key Switching).
Given a ciphertext (a, b),a = (a[1], · · · , a[n]), consider the linear evaluation function
fa,b : Znq → Zq as follows: fa,b(x) = b − 〈a,x〉 = b −
n∑
i=1
a[i] · x[i] (mod q), where the
variables are x = (x[1], · · · ,x[n]). Note that m = fa,b(s) (mod 2). Now, one wants to
make an evaluation function which is a combination of additions and multiplications of
these f over different ciphertexts (ai, bi).
First note that
f(a,b)(x) + f(a′,b′)(x) = (b−
n∑
i=1
a[i] · x[i]) + (b′ −
n∑
i=1
a′[i] · x[i])
= (b+ b′)−
n∑
i=1
(a[i] + a′[i]) · x[i]
= f(a+a′,b+b′)(x),
so addition in f is homomorphic.
However, multiplication seems problematic, as
f(a,b)(x) · f(a′,b′)(x) = (b−
n∑
i=1
a[i] · x[i]) · (b′ −
n∑
i=1
a′[i] · x[i])
= h0 +
n∑
i=1
hi · x[i] +
∑
1≤i≤j≤n
hi,j · x[i]x[j],
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where
h0 = bb
′,
hi = −(ba′[i] + b′a[i]),
hi,j = a[i]a
′[j] + a[j]a′[i].
The problem here is that the number of coefficients is 1 + n+
(
n+1
2
)
= (n+1)(n+2)2 , so the
ciphertext becomes quadratic in the size of s.
This can be overcome by a method called relinearization [BV11]. Suppose that the secret
key s = (s[1], . . . , s[n]) is changed into a secret key
t = (s[1], . . . , s[n], s[1]s[1], s[1]s[2], . . . , s[n]s[n]).
Then ha,b(x) = f(a,b)(x) · f(a′,b′)(x) becomes linear in t. Moreover, ha,b(t) mod 2 =
m ·m′.
Relinearization makes our public key encryption scheme become a somewhat homo-
morphic scheme. The secret key is somewhat larger, but as this is only used in decryption,
this does not increase the communication or homomorphic evaluation complexity.
3.3.3.2 Modulus Switching.
We have shown how to use relinearization to make a homomorphic evaluation function
with the LWE-based encryption scheme. To make this scheme fully homomorphic, the
challenge is to manage the noise. One such method is modulus switching [BV11]. Es-
sentially, this method changes the ciphertext c ∈ Znq to a ciphertext c′ ∈ Znp , where
decrypting c′ still gives m. This method will be discussed in more detail when discussing
the [BGV12] scheme.
3.3.4 Analysis
The performance of the [BV11] scheme is as follows:
• Secret key: The secret key s ∈ Znq , with size n log q = O(λ log λ) bits.
• Single ciphertext: The ciphertext c ∈ Zn+1q , with size (n + 1) log q = O(λ log λ)
bits.
• Public key: (n+ 1)((n+ 1) log q + 2λ) log q bits.
• Evaluation key: O˜(n2+2) bits.
• Per-gate computation: O˜(k3 · L5),
where λ is the security parameter,  ∈ (0, 1), q = 2n , p = 16nk log 2q, and L is the
maximum depth that the scheme can correctly evaluate circuits.
CHAPTER 3. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 26
3.4 Brakerski, Gentry and Vaikuntanathan’s Scheme
[BGV12]
3.4.1 Overview
The scheme uses a technique named key switching / modulus reduction which generalises
the relinearization method we have seen in [BV11]. Here the relinearization procedure
can be used to transform any ciphertext c1 decryptable to m with secret key s1 into a
ciphertext c2 decryptable to m with secret key s2, not necessarily reducing the dimension
of the ciphertext. This enables the evaluation function to be somewhat homomorphic.
To achieve a fully homomorphic scheme, the modulus switching method from [BV11]
is again introduced. However, the technique is refined to manage the noise better, so
that a fully homomorphic scheme can be achieved without bootstrapping. Bootstrapping
is later introduced, but as an optimization technique.
The most significant development of [BGV12] compared to [BV11] is the use of well-
known security assumptions based on RLWE, where the use of RLWE over standard LWE
paves way to a more efficient fully homomorphic scheme. Also, a careful use of modulus
switching achieves fully homomorphic encryption without the need for bootstrapping.
3.4.2 Encryption Scheme
Brakerski, Gentry and Vaikuntanathan use general encryption scheme that can be in-
stantiated to both LWE and RLWE. However, we will focus on the more efficient RLWE
setting. The RLWE-based public key encryption scheme as follows. Given the security
parameter λ and an additional parameter µ, first choose a µ-bit modulus q. Then choose
d = d(λ, µ), χ = χ(λ, µ), n = d3 log qe.
Let Rq = Zq[x]/(f(x)) with f(x) a polynomial of degree d. To get the secret key,
we first draw s′ uniformly from χ. The secret key is then s = (1, s′) ∈ R2q . To get the
public key, first generate vectors A′ ← Rnq , e ← χn, then set b = −A′s′ + 2e. Set the
public key A = (b|A′) ∈ Rn×2q . Note that A · s = 2e.
Suppose m ∈ {0, 1} is the bit we want to encrypt. To encrypt, we do the following:
1. Select a random r ∈ Rn2 and expand the message to m = (m, 0) ∈ R2q .
2. Output c = m+ATr ∈ R2q .
According to RLWEd,q,χ (where χ is a uniform distribution over Rq), we can use this
scheme a polynomial number of times with negligible probability that an adversary can
guess s.
To decrypt, we do the following:
1. Compute b′ = [〈c, s〉]q.
2. Output m = [b′]2.
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3.4.3 Ideas
3.4.3.1 Key Switching (Dimension Reduction).
This technique generalizes the relinearization method we have seen in [BV11]. It consists
of two basic operations as follows:
• BitDecomp(x ∈ Rnq , q) decomposes x into its bit representation u ∈ Rn·dlog qe2 .
We do this by first writing x =
dlog qe∑
i=0
2i · ui with all ui ∈ Rn2 , then output u =
(u0,u1, · · · ,udlog qe) ∈ Rn·dlog qe2 .
• Powersof2(x ∈ Rnq , q) expands x into u ∈ Rn·dlog qeq that has copies of x multiplied
by powers of 2. The output is (x, 2 · x, · · · , 2dlog qex) ∈ Rn·dlog qeq .
Lemma 3.4.1 〈BitDecomp(c, q), Powersof2(s, q)〉 = 〈c, s〉 mod q.
Proof We will give a more detailed proof than in [BV11]. Writing c =
dlog qe∑
i=0
2i · ci,
we have BitDecomp(c, q) = (c0, c1, · · · , cdlog qe). Also, Powersof2(s, q) = (s, 2 ·
s, · · · , 2dlog qes). Hence,
〈BitDecomp(c, q), Powersof2(s, q)〉 =
dlog qe∑
i=0
〈ci, 2i · s〉
=
dlog qe∑
i=0
2i · 〈ci, s〉
=
dlog qe∑
i=0
〈2i · ci, s〉
= 〈
dlog qe∑
i=0
2i · ci, s〉
= 〈c, s〉 mod q
The key switching technique can be defined by the following two operations.
SwitchKeyGen(s1 ∈ Rn1q , s2 ∈ Rn2q ):
1. Generate a public key A as previously described, but with secret key s2 and pa-
rameter n = n1 · dlog qe .
2. Set B = [Powersof2(s1)|O], that is the matrix with first column containing
Powersof2(s1) and augmenting some columns with all elements zero until it
matches the size of A.
3. Set C = A+B, and output τs1→s2 = C.
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SwitchKey(τs1→s2 , c1): Output c2 = BitDecomp(c1)T ·C.
The following lemma proves that key switching works.
Lemma 3.4.2 Let s1, s2, q,A,B,C be as in SwitchKeyGen(s1, s2), and let A · s2 =
2e2 ∈ RNq . Let c1 ∈ Rn1q and c2 ← SwitchKey(τs1→s2 , c1). Then we have
〈c2, s2〉 = 2〈BitDecomp(c1), e2〉+ 〈c1, s1〉 mod q.
Proof We will give a more detailed proof than in [BV11]. By definition,
〈c2, s2〉 = 〈BitDecomp(c1)T ·C, s2〉
= BitDecomp(c1)
T ·C · s2
= BitDecomp(c1)
T · (A+B) · s2
= BitDecomp(c1)
T · (2e2 + Powersof2(s1))
= 2〈BitDecomp(c1), e2〉+ 〈BitDecomp(c1), Powersof2(s1)〉
= 2〈BitDecomp(c1), e2〉+ 〈c1, s1〉 mod q. (from Lemma 3.4.1)
This lemma implies that key switching only produces an error
‖2〈BitDecomp(c1), e2〉‖2 which is small because BitDecomp(c1) only has coefficients 0
or 1 in the inner product.
3.4.3.2 Modulus Switching.
The modulus switching technique used is a variant of the one used in [BV11]. This
method changes the ciphertext c ∈ R2q to a ciphertext c′ ∈ R2p, where decrypting c′ still
gives m.
Suppose we have a ciphertext c = (c1, c2) ∈ R2q , and consider c′ to be the vector
closest (using `1-norm) to (p/q)·c. such that c′ ≡ c mod 2. Note that for some k ∈ Z we
have [〈c, s〉]q = 〈c, s〉−kq. Define e = 〈c′, s〉−kp = [〈c, s〉]q+(〈c′, s〉−〈c′, s〉)+(kq−kp).
So e ≡ [〈c, s〉]q mod 2. Also, if s is chosen such that |[〈c, s〉]q| < q/2 − (q/p)`1(s), we
can then show that e ≡ [〈c, s〉]p mod 2, which means that decrypting c and c′ will
result to the same message. Moreover with this choice of s, we can also show that
|[〈c, s〉]p| < |[〈c, s〉]q|+ `1(s). This means that if we choose a short secret key s (i.e. with
a small `1(s)) and small enough p relative to q, we can significantly decrease the amount
of noise in the ciphertext.
Now we will give a short analysis (slightly modified from [BGV12]) of how much noise
can actually be reduced. Suppose q is approximately xk, and we have two ciphertexts
with noise approximately x. Without modulus switching, note that addition creates
noise of size 2x, and multiplication creates noise of size x2. Hence, we can evaluate
multiplication with depth at most log k before the noise becomes too large. However,
using modulus switching, we get that the noise after multiplication comes down from x2
back to x, with the modulus reduced from qi to qi/x. So by choosing a good chain of
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decreasing moduli (q, q/x, q/x2, · · · ), there can be up to k levels of multiplication. Also,
this method can be used at any time during evaluation because we did not require the
secret key to perform it.
3.4.4 Analysis
The performance of the [BGV12] scheme is as follows (RLWE case):
• Secret key: The secret key is 2 ring elements, which require 2d log q bits.
• Single ciphertext: The ciphertext also consists of 2 ring elements, which require
2d log q bits.
• Public key: The public key A ∈ Rn×2q consists of 2n ring elements, which require
2dn log q bits.
• Key switching: O˜(dn3 log2 q).
• Modulus switching: O˜(dn2 log q).
• Per-gate computation: O˜(k · L3),
where, with λ as the security parameter, q = Θ(2λ), d = Ω(λ log λ), n = d3 log qe, and L
is the maximum depth that the scheme can correctly evaluate circuits. Here, we recall
that Rq = Zq[x]/(f(x)) with f(x) a polynomial of degree d. So an element in Rq has
size log qd = d log q bits. Also, we focus the analysis on the RLWE version, as it is more
efficient than the LWE instantiation.
3.5 Brakerski’s Scheme [Bra12]
3.5.1 Overview
The scheme works in an invariant perspective, where only the ratio q/B matters. This is
done by scaling the ciphertext down by a factor of q (that is, c′ = c/q). In this perspective,
homomorphic multiplication multiplies the noise by a polynomial factor p(n), which is an
improvement from [BGV12] where homomorphic multiplication squares the noise. One
significant change in this scheme is that it does not use modulus switching as in the
previous two schemes.
3.5.2 Encryption Scheme
Brakerski uses Regev’s LWE-based public key encryption scheme [Reg05] as follows.
Given the security parameter n, let q = q(n) be an integer and χ = χ(n) be a distribution
over Z. We have the secret key s = (s[1], · · · , s[n]) ∈ Znq . To get the public key, first let
N = (n+ 1) · (log q+O(1)). Sample A← ZN×n and e← χN . Compute b = [A · s+ e]q.
The public key is then P = [b|−A] ∈ ZN×(n+1).
Suppose m ∈ {0, 1}. To encrypt m, we do the following:
1. Select a random r ∈ {0, 1}N .
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2. Set m = (m, 0, · · · , 0) ∈ {0, 1}n+1.
3. Output c = [P T · r + bq/2c ·m]q ∈ Zn+1q
To decrypt a ciphertext c, we do the following:
1. Compute c0 = [〈c, (1, s)〉]q.
2. Output m = [b2 · c0/qe]2.
The correctness of this scheme can be seen from analyzing the encryption and de-
cryption noise. The noise magnitude of properly encrypted ciphertexts can be shown to
be small, by the following lemma.
Lemma 3.5.1 Let q, n,N, |χ| ≤ B be parameters for Regev’s public key encryption
scheme. Let s ∈ Zn be a vector and m ∈ {0, 1} be some bit. Set P as the public
key generated from Regev’s scheme with secret key s, and c be the ciphertext created by
encrypting m under public key P . Then for some e with |e| ≤ N ·B it holds that
〈c, (1, s)〉 = bq/2c ·m+ e (mod q)
Proof We will give a detailed and more elementary proof than in [Bra12]. Let r be
the random element sampled, and m be the extended message vector in the Regev
encryption. Then we have that
〈c, (1, s)〉 = 〈P T · r + bq/2c ·m, (1, s)〉
= 〈bq/2c ·m, (1, s)〉+ 〈P T · r, (1, s)〉
= bq/2c ·m+ rTP · (1, s)
= bq/2c ·m+ rT (b−As)
= bq/2c ·m+ rT · e
= bq/2c ·m+ 〈r, e〉 (mod q).
As r ∈ {0, 1}N , we have |r| ≤ N . Also, by definition |e| ≤ B. So by Cauchy-Schwarz,
we have that |〈r, e〉| ≤ |r||e| ≤ N ·B, and the lemma follows by setting e = 〈r, e〉.
Moreover, for ciphertexts with a small noise, decryption gives the correct message
according to the following lemma:
Lemma 3.5.2 Let s ∈ Zn be some vector, and let c ∈ Zn+1q be such that
〈c, (1, s)〉 = bq/2c ·m+ e (mod q)
with m ∈ {0, 1} and |e| ≤ q/4. Then the decryption of c under secret key s outputs m.
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Proof By definition, we have that in the decryption, c0 = [〈c, (1, s)〉]q = bq/2c ·m+ e.
So, decryption outputs
[b2 · c0/qe]2 = [b2 · (bq/2c ·m+ e)/qe]2
= [b2bq/2c ·m/q + 2e/qe]2
= m
since |2e/q| < 2(q/4)/q = 1/2 so the rounding is correct.
3.5.3 Ideas
3.5.3.1 Homomorphic properties.
We start from Regev’s public key encryption scheme, where the encryption of m ∈ {0, 1}
is a vector c ∈ Znq such that [〈c, s〉]q = b q2c · m + e with |e| ≤ E. First take the
invariant perspective, and set c′ = c/q. Then [〈c′, s〉]1 = 12 ·m+ e′ with |e′| ≤ E/q = .
Additive homomorphism can be seen directly in this perspective: if c1, c2 encrypt m1,m2
respectively, then
cadd = c1 + c2
encrypts [m1+m2]2, with noise approximately 2. Multiplicative homomorphism is done
by defining
cmult = 2 · c1 ⊗ c2.
The above tensored ciphertext can be decrypted using a tensored secret key s⊗s, because
〈2 · c1 ⊗ c2, s⊗ s〉 = 2〈c1, s〉 · 〈c2, s〉.
To show why this definition works, we have to show that [2〈c1, s〉·〈c2, s〉]1 ≈ 12m1m2+
e′ , for a small e′. We start by letting I1, I2 ∈ Z be integers, and e1, e2 with absolute
value less than  be rational numbers such that
〈c1, s〉 = 1
2
m1 + e1 + I1
〈c2, s〉 = 1
2
m2 + e2 + I2
Then we have:
2〈c1, s〉 · 〈c2, s〉 = 2 · (1
2
m1 + e1 + I1) · (1
2
m1 + e2 + I2)
=
1
2
m1m2 + 2(e1I2 + e2I1) + (e1m2 + e2m1 + 2e1e2)
+(m1I2 +m2I1 + 2I1I2)
But m1,m2 ∈ {0, 1} so m1I2 +m2I1 + 2I1I2 ∈ Z. Also, the term 2e1e2 that squares
the noise in [BV11] and [BGV12] can now be ignored as |2e1e2| ≤ 22  . By the
triangle inequality, we also have that |e1m2 + e2m1| ≤ |e1m2|+ |e2m1| ≤ |e1|+ |e2| < 2.
Therefore the noise is dominated by the term e′ = 2(e1I2 + e2I1). [Bra12] shows that
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this term is bounded by O(‖s‖1) · , and that by choosing q ≤ 2n, ‖s‖1 only depends on
n and independent of B, q. Hence we have:
[2〈c1, s〉 · 〈c2, s〉]1 = 1
2
m1m2 + 2(e1I2 + e2I1) + (e1m2 + e2m1 + 2e1e2)
≈ 1
2
m1m2 + 2(e1I2 + e2I1)
≈ 1
2
m1m2 + e
′
3.5.3.2 Vector Decomposition and Key Switching.
Vector decomposition is done to reduce the norm of s, resulting in the previous discussion
having a smaller noise. Initially, ‖s‖1 ≤ n · q, as the elements of the secret key s
are sampled uniformly from Zq. As in [BGV12], vector decomposition uses two basic
operations BitDecomp and Powersof2.
Key switching is done as in Brakerski, Gentry and Vaikuntanathan’s scheme. It also
uses the operations BitDecomp and Powersof2 to define SwitchKeyGen(s1, s2) and
SwitchKey(τs1→s2 , c1).
3.5.4 Analysis
The performance of the [Bra12] scheme is as follows:
• Secret key: s ∈ Znq , with size n log q bits.
• Single ciphertext: c ∈ Zn+1q , with size (n+ 1) log q bits.
• Public key: P ∈ ZN×nq , with size N · n log q bits. But N = O(n log q), so P has
size O(n2 log2 q) bits.
3.6 Fan and Vercauteren’s Scheme [FV12]
3.6.1 Overview
This scheme improves upon Brakerski’s scheme by using a more efficient scheme that
bases its assumptions on RLWE instead of LWE. Specifically, it contains a modified
version of the LPR scheme for optimization and easier analysis. Also, there will be a re-
linearization process similar to that discussed in Brakerski, Gentry and Vaikuntanathan’s
scheme, so there will be a need to have an additional element to the LPR scheme which
is the relinearization key rlk. This relinearization key will be used to compute the ho-
momorphic multiplication cmult.
3.6.2 Encryption Scheme
Fan and Vercauteren uses the RLWE-based LPR scheme as follows [LPR10].
• R = Z[x]/(xd + 1), where d is a power of 2, and set the message space to be Rt for
some integer t > 1. Set ∆ = bq/tc.
CHAPTER 3. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 33
• Secret key: s ∈ Rq, sampled from a noise distribution χ.
• Public key: (b = −(a · s+ e) mod q, a) ∈ R2q , where a is sampled from Rq
• Encryption: Suppose we want to encrypt m ∈ Rt.
Sample r, e1, e2 from χ. Return (u, v) where
u = a · r + e1 + ∆ ·m mod q,
v = b · r + e2 mod q.
• Decryption: First compute u + v · s = (r · e − s · e1 + e2) + ∆ ·m mod q. Then
multiply by tq and round to the nearest integer modulo t.
As in Brakerski’s scheme, we can show that decryption is correct for properly en-
crypted ciphertexts. This is dealt with by the following lemma. One important thing to
note is that all norms used in this scheme is the infinity norm ‖.‖∞, not the Euclidean
norm as in the previous schemes. The expansion factor also uses the infinity norm:
δR = max{ ‖a · b‖∞‖a‖∞‖b‖∞ : a, b ∈ R}.
With this in mind, we can proceed to the lemma:
Lemma 3.6.1 If ||χ||∞ < B, then for some ||v||∞ ≤ 2 · δR ·B2 +B we have that
[u+ v · s]q = ∆ ·m+ v. (3.1)
Moreover, if 2 · δR ·B2 +B < ∆/2, decryption works correctly.
.
Proof We will give a partial proof, which is more detailed, but use a claim in [FV12].
Using the definitions from the encryption, we have
u+ v · s = a · r + e1 + ∆ ·m+ b · r · s+ e2 · s
= ∆ ·m+ (e · u+ e1 + e2 · s) mod q.
If we set v = e · r + e1 + e2 · s, then as ||x · y||∞ ≤ ‖x‖∞ · ‖y‖∞δR ≤ B2δR, we have
v ≤ ‖e · r‖∞ + ‖e1‖∞ + ‖e2 · s‖∞
≤ δR ·B2 +B + δR ·B2
= 2 · δR ·B2 +B.
Let r be an element such that u+ v · s = ∆ ·m+ v + q · r. Then we have
t
q
(u+ v · s) = t/q ·∆ ·m+ (t/q) · v + t · r
= t/q · (q/t− ) ·m+ (t/q) · v + t · r
= m+ (t/q) · (v −  ·m) + t · r,
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where  = q/t−∆ = q/t− bq/tc < 1.
Fan and Vercauteren claim that (t/q) · ‖v−  ·m‖∞ < 1/2 [FV12]. With this claim, and
noting that m ∈ Rt, m+ (t/q) · (v −  ·m) + t · r mod t = m+ (t/q) · (v −  ·m) rounds
to m.
3.6.3 Ideas
The encryption scheme is a modified version of the LPR scheme, where the s, u are
sampled from R2 instead of χ. Fan and Vercauteren argue that assuming the results
for the LWE setting carry over to the RLWE setting, this modification will have minor
security implications. This will imply ‖s‖∞ = ‖r‖∞ = 1, and the bound in the previous
lemma becomes
v ≤ δR‖e‖∞ · ‖r‖∞ + ‖e1‖∞ + δR‖e2‖∞ · ‖s‖∞
≤ δR ·B · 1 +B + δR ·B · 1
= 2 · δR ·B +B.
The main invariant is given in (3.1), where if we interpret the elements of the ciphertext
as the coefficients of the polynomial ct(x) (that is, ct(x) = u+ v · s), then evaluating this
polynomial with x = s will give us:
[ct(s)]q = ∆ ·m+ v,
which using the previous lemma enables us to correctly recover the message m.
3.6.3.1 Homomorphic Properties
3.6.3.1.1 Additive homomorphism. An appropriate operation for additive homo-
morphism can be seen directly. First note that if [cti(s)]q = ∆ ·mi + vi, then we have
that
[ct1(s) + ct2(s)]q = ∆ · [m1 +m2]t + v1 + v2 −  · t · r
where  = q/t−∆ = q/t− bq/tc < 1. Moreover, using the modified version, ‖r‖∞ ≤ 1,
so the noise grows additively with maximum ‖t · r‖∞ ≤ t. So we can define:
cadd(ct1, ct2) = ([ct1[0] + ct2[0]]q, [ct1[1] + ct2[1]]q)
3.6.3.1.2 Multiplicative homomorphism. Finding an operation for multiplicative
homomorphism is not so straightforward. First we define
cti = ∆ ·mi + vi + q · ri.
Then multiplying for i = 1, 2 gives us:
(ct1 · ct2)(s) = (∆ ·m1 + v1 + q · r1) · (∆ ·m2 + v2 + q · r2)
= ∆2 ·m1 ·m2 + ∆ · (m1 · v2 +m2 · v1) + q(v1 · r2 + v2 · r1)
+ v1 · v2 + q ·∆ · (m1 · r2 +m2 · r1) + q2 · r1 · r2.
We can see that to get an encryption of [m1 ·m2]t, we must divide the above equation
by ∆. However, this might create errors in rounding, as ∆ does not necessarily divide q.
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To prevent rounding errors, we instead divide by q/t (or equivalently multiply by t/q).
Let ct1(x) + ct2(x) = c0 + c1 · x+ c2 · x2. Then we can get the approximation:
t
q
· (ct1 · ct2)(s) = bt · c0/qe+ bt · c1/qe · s+ bt · c2/qe · s2 + ra
where
ra = (bt · c0/qe − t · c0/q) + (bt · c1/qe − t · c1/q) · s+ (bt · c2/qe − t · c2/q) · s2
and by the triangle inequality and the fact that ‖a − bae‖∞ ≤ 1/2 for all real numbers
a, we have
‖ra‖∞ ≤ ‖bt · c0/qe − t · c0/q‖∞ + ‖(bt · c1/qe − t · c1/q) · s‖∞
+‖(bt · c2/qe − t · c2/q) · s2‖∞
≤ 1/2 + 1/2 · δR · ‖s‖∞ + 1/2 · δ2R · ‖s‖2∞
< 1/2 + ·δR · ‖s‖∞ + 1/2 · δ2R · ‖s‖2∞
= (δR · ‖s‖∞ + 1)2/2.
This gives an idea of a homomorphic multiplication where ct1, ct2 each with two elements
is multiplied into a result with three elements.
cbasicmult(ct1, ct2) =
t
q
· (ct1 · ct2)(s)
Fan and Vercauteren analyze the noise using the following lemma [FV12].
Lemma 3.6.2 Let cti for i = 1, 2 be two ciphertexts, with [cti(s)]q = ∆ ·mi + vi and E
such that ‖vi‖∞ < E < ∆/2. Let ct1(x) + ct2(x) = c0 + c1 · x+ c2 · x2. Then
[bt · c0/qe+ bt · c0/qe · s+ bt · c2/qe · s2]q = ∆ · [m1m2]t + v3
with ‖v3‖∞ < 2 · δR · t · E · (δR · ‖s‖∞ + 1) + 2 · t2 · δ2R · (‖s‖∞ + 1)2.
By using this lemma, and noting that the term 2·δR·t·E·(δR·‖s‖∞+1)+2·t2·δ2R·(‖s‖∞+1)2
is dominated by 2 · t2 · δ2R · ‖s‖2∞, we can see that the noise is multiplied roughly by
2 · t · δ2R · ‖s‖∞. Using the optimization stated before with ‖s‖∞ = 1, the noise is
multiplied roughly by a much smaller factor 2 · t · δ2R after multiplication.
3.6.3.2 Relinearization.
The previous lemma shows that we can do multiplication, at the cost of increasing
the size of the ciphertext. To keep the number of ciphertext elements down, Fan and
Vercauteren use relinearization like in the previous schemes. The goal is to transform a
degree 2 ciphertext we obtained from basic multiplication, ct = [c0, c1, c2] into a degree
1 ciphertext ct′ = [c′0, c′1], such that
[c0 + c1 · s+ c2 · s2]q = [c′0 + c′1 · s+ r]q
where ‖r‖ is a small error, meaning that ct and ct′ will both correctly decrypt to the same
message m ∈ Rt. This step will require a relinearization key rlk. Fan and Vercauteren
have two different ideas of relinearization that they propose.
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3.6.3.2.1 Relinearization version 1. The first idea is to further generalize the key
switching technique in [BGV12], by decomposing into a base T (the previous schemes
use T = 2). This is done by writing c2 in base T , that is c2 =
l∑
i=0
T i · c(i)2 mod q.
Generalizing the relinearization key in the previous schemes, the relinearization key rlk
will consist of elements T is2 masked with some noise:
rlk = [([−(ai · s+ ei) + T i · s2]q, ai) : i ∈ [0...l].
Here, the relinearization key rlk uses l+ 1 bits, with l = blogT qe. This means that when
T increases, logT q =
log q
log T decreases, and hence the relinearization key is smaller.
3.6.3.2.2 Relinearization version 2. The second idea uses some form of modulus
switching, by switching from modulo q to modulo p · q for some integer p. The idea here
is that it is sufficient to approximate c2 · s2 modulo q, that is find c2,0, c2,1 such that
c2,0 + c2,0 · s = c2 · s2 + r for a small r. So the relinearization key is of the form:
rlk = ([−(a · s+ e) + p · s2]p·q, a), a ∈ Rp·q, e← χ.
3.6.3.3 Redefinition of homomorphic multiplication.
By using one of these two relinearization techniques, we can define homomorphic multi-
plication such that evaluating a multiplication still results in two elements.
In the first version, we have
cmult = (c
′
0, c
′
1),
where
c′0 = [c0 +
l∑
i=0
rlk[i][0] · c(i)2 ]q,
c′1 = [c1 +
l∑
i=0
rlk[i][1] · c(i)2 ]q,
and rlk = [([−(ai · s+ ei) + T i · s2]q, ai) : i ∈ [0...l].
In the second version, we have
cmult = ([c0 + c2,0]q, [c1 + c2,1]q),
where
c2,0 = [bc2 · rlk[0]
p
e]q,
c2,1 = [bc2 · rlk[0]
p
e]q,
and rlk = ([−(a · s+ e) + p · s2]p·q, a).
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3.6.3.4 Towards Fully Homomorphic Encryption.
The previous idea gives us a somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme, as it can only
evaluate functions up to some maximum level before the noise becomes too big. To
turn the scheme into a fully homomorphic encryption scheme, Fan and Vercauteren
use Gentry’s bootstrapping technique. Here, the decryption function of the somewhat
homomorphic scheme is evaluated homomorphically to obtain an encryption of the same
message as before, but with a smaller noise (according to the depth of the decryption
circuit.) Fan and Vercauteren consider two cases: the optimized case which gives the
simplest decryption function, and a general case.
3.6.3.4.1 Optimized case: q = 2n and t = 2n−k, k > 0. Then we can write ∆ = 2k,
so any division by ∆ will be a simple right shift. Also, since
t
q
· [c0 + c1 · s]q = [c0 + c1 · s]q
∆
,
decryption can be done fast.
3.6.3.4.2 General Case. This case is dealt with by reducing to the optimized case
by a form of modulus switching. From section 3.6.3.1 and lemma 3.6.1, a ciphertext ct
satisfies ct[0] + ct[1] · s = ∆ ·m + v + q · r, with ‖v‖∞ < ∆/2. Assuming the noise v
has not reached is maximal size, we can switch from modulus q to modulus 2n where
2n ≤ q < 2n+1 by multiplying the ciphertext by 2n/q. So if we set
c0 = b2n · ct[0]/qe,
c1 = b2n · ct[1]/qe,
and note that 2
n
q · qt = 2
n
t and
2n
q · q = 2n, we get that
c0 + c1 · s = b2n · ct[0]/qe+ b2n · ct[1]/qe · s
= b2
n
t
cm+ e+ 2n · r.
As long as the new error ‖e‖∞ < b2n/tc/2, lemma 3.6.1 says we will now obtain a valid
ciphertext modulus 2n. By considering (c0, c1) as the ciphertext to decrypt, decryption
now becomes as simple as the optimized case.
3.6.4 Analysis
The performance of the [FV12] scheme is as follows:
• Secret key: The secret key s is sampled from a distribution χ over R, so its size
will be a function of d and λ. With the optimization that s is sampled from R2,
we have that the secret key is d bits.
• Single ciphertext: The ciphertext is two elements in Rq, so it has size 2d log q bits.
• Public key: The public key is also two elements in Rq, so it has size 2d log q bits.
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• Relinearization version 1:
– Relinearization key: As discussed in Section 3.6.3.2, the relinearization key rlk
uses l + 1 bits, with l = blogT qe. So the relinearization key is approximately
logT q bits.
– Number of operations: The formula shown in Section 3.6.3.2 shows that c0
and c1 each do l = blogT qe multiplications and 1 addition. So there are
approximately 2 · logT q multiplications and 2 additions in the relinearization.
Here T is the base used in relinearization.
• Relinearization version 2:
– Relinearization key: Only 2 elements in Rp·q are used, where p is the parameter
for the relinearization. So the relinearization key is 4d log p · q bits.
– Number of operations: The formula shown in Section 3.6.3.2 shows that c0
and c1 each do one multiplication, one division, and one rounding . So there
are 2 multiplications, 2 divisions, and 2 roundings.
Here we use the fact that λ is the security parameter, and that elements in R have degree
at most d.
3.7 Comparison of Fully Homomorphic Encryption
Schemes
In this section we will give a comparison of the latest fully homomorphic encryption
schemes discussed in this section. Table 3.1 compares the key and ciphertext sizes for
each scheme. Note that while [BGV12] has instantations for both LWE and RLWE, we
only use the result of the more efficient RLWE case.
Scheme Based on Secret key size Ciphertext size Public key size
[BV11] LWE n log q (n+ 1) log q O(n2 log2 q)
[BGV12] LWE and
RLWE
2d log q 2d log q 2dn log q
[Bra12] LWE n log q (n+ 1) log q O(n2 log2 q)
[FV12] RLWE d 2d log q 2d log q
Table 3.1: Comparison of key and ciphertext sizes (in bits).
From this table we can see the similarities between the schemes based on the same
assumption, with respect to key and ciphertext sizes. The schemes [BGV12] and [FV12]
that are based on RLWE, use less bits than [BV11] and [Bra12] that are based on LWE.
The [FV12] scheme uses the least bits overall, due to the optimization of the secret key,
and a much smaller public key that is not a matrix, in contrast to the other schemes.
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We will now take a look at the ideas and improvements for each work. Brakersi and
Vaikuntanathan’s work introduced the following concepts:
1. An LWE-based scheme with security that is better studied than Gentry’s scheme
that used ideal lattices.
2. Relinearization as a way of keeping the ciphertext size constant, and create a
somewhat homomorphic scheme.
3. Modulus switching as a way to manage the noise and remove the need for the
expensive squashing step as in Gentry’s scheme.
Meanwhile, Brakersi, Gentry, and Vaikuntanathan’s work introduced the following con-
cepts:
1. A general scheme with both LWE-based and RLWE-based instantiations, with the
RLWE version more efficient than Brakersi and Vaikuntanathan’s scheme.
2. Relinearization generalized into key switching .
3. Modulus switching that is better implemented to reduce noise without bootstrap-
ping.
4. Better analysis on noise than in [BV11].
Brakersi’s work introduced the following concepts:
1. An LWE-based scheme that has classical reduction to GapSVP. This is in contrast
with previous schemes that only have quantum reduction.
2. Invariant perspective, where the noise isn’t squared by multiplication but only
multiplied by a fixed polynomial .
3. Key switching as in [BGV12].
Finally, Fan and Vercauteren’s work introduced the following concepts:
1. A scheme that extends Brakerski’s idea to the RLWE setting. This scheme is more
efficient than all the other schemes discussed.
2. Two variations of relinearization to make the scheme somewhat homomorphic. The
first version is a generalization of the key switching in [BGV12]. While the second
one uses a method similar to modulus switching.
3. A simpler decryption circuit with simpler analysis than previous work. The simplic-
ity comes from reducing all cases to the optimal case, where scaling is implemented
by binary right shift.
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The following table gives an overview of the main ideas of the FHE schemes.
Scheme Main Ideas
[BV11] Relinearization, modulus switching, LWE-based
[BGV12] Key switching, better modulus switching, LWE and RLWE-based
[Bra12] Invariant perspective, key switching, LWE-based, classical reduction to
GapSVP
[FV12] Two versions of relinearization, more efficient RLWE-based cryptosys-
tem, simpler decryption circuit
Table 3.2: Main ideas of FHE schemes
Chapter 4
Possible Improvements
4.1 Finding a Good Upper Bound for the Expansion
Factor
In Brakerski, Gentry and Vaikuntanathan’s scheme [BGV12], some of the bounds use
the fact that the expansion factor γR ≤
√
d. However, various experiments has led
to the conjecture that the upper bound for the expansion factor is less than
√
d. If
it were possible to find a tighter upper bound for the expansion factor, it will lead to
improvements in all bounds that are related to the expansion factor, such as the lemmas
about modulus switching in [BGV12]. This will be a topic for future work.
4.2 Batching
The idea of batching is to compute many functions in parallel by only evaluating a single
function with a larger modulus, using the idea of the Chinese Remainder Theorem. In
the previous schemes based on RLWE, we used R = Z[x]/(xd + 1) plaintext space of R2.
However, there is an alternative which is to use Rp which is isomorphic to Rp1×· · ·×Rpd
[BGV12]. Here, evaluating a function over Rp using the input m ∈ Rnp will evaluate the
same function over Rpi using the input [m]pi ∈ Rnpi for i = 1, · · · , d.
The advantage of using batching is that one can encrypt d sets of plaintext at once
and perform d simultaneous evaluations on them, at the cost of one evaluation modulo
p. The result will be a value that can be decomposed into d tuples, each containing the
intended output. The one restriction is that all these d evaluations perform the same
function, and take the same number of parameters.
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Applications
Some possible applications of fully homomorphic encryption are as follows.
5.1 Secure two-party computation [DFH12]
Fully homomorphic encryption can be used to implement a two-party computation pro-
tocol that is secure both against honest-but-curious adversaries, and against malicious
adversaries. The protocol consists of one round with sublinear communication complex-
ity, with the following basic idea:
The first party P1 sends its encrypted input to the second party P2, who uses the homo-
morphic property to compute ciphertexts that contain the output of the specified circuit
when evaluated on P1’s (encrypted) input and his own private input. These ciphertexts
are sent to P1 who can decrypt and learn the result.
This idea alone is not secure in the malicious model, as P2 can just perform a
different function than the one intended. This can be solved by asking P2 to provide a
non-interactive zero-knowledge proof (NIZK) that he returns a ciphertext containing the
correct result (without giving away any additional information). To keep the solution
communication-efficient, the NIZK can be based on fully homomorphic encryption: the
prover sends an encryption of his proof, the verifier then computes, using homomorphic
evaluation, a ciphertext containing a bit that is 1 if and only if the proof is correct.
Finally the prover gives a standard NIZK that the corresponding ciphertext indeed
contains the bit 1.
5.2 Oblivious databases [LNV11, BV11]
Suppose we want to store data in the cloud. The owner of the data would like to have
privacy, so that all his input data, and outputs of all operations on that data will remain
secret. This can be done using fully homomorphic encryption. Users can store private
data in the cloud as ciphertexts c1, · · · , cn, all encrypted using their own public key. Then
all operations or aggregate functions f(c1, · · · , cn) on them are done as homomorphic
evaluations, using the techniques described in this text, without leaking anything to the
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server. The output is sent back to the user, who can get his required result by using the
decryption function on this output.
Efficient private information retrieval can also be implemented, where the user can
retrieve a stored value ci from the server without the server knowing anything about
the value i. One such implementation, which requires a somewhat homomorphic and
symmetric encryption, can be seen in [BV11].
Chapter 6
Conclusion
We have seen the significance of having an efficient fully homomorphic encryption scheme.
We have also analyzed several fully homomorphic encryption schemes, which have some
common elements:
1. An efficient lattice-based cryptosystem, with security based on the hardness of
well-known lattice problems.
2. An evaluation function with definitions for cadd and cmult, such that the noise does
not rapidly increase.
3. Techniques to make the scheme fully homomorphic with this evaluation function.
We started with Gentry’s scheme, the first fully homomorphic encryption scheme,
and techniques such as the use of bootstrapping that have helped the rapid development
of similar schemes. Gentry also provided the blueprint to construct fully homomorphic
schemes:
1. Construct an encryption scheme that is somewhat homomorphic.
2. Simplify the decryption function as much as possible by the squashing technique.
3. Do bootstrapping, which is to evaluate the resulting decryption function homomor-
phically using the evaluation function.
Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan’s scheme built on this by introducing a cryptosystem
based on learning with errors (LWE), and using new techniques relinearization and mod-
ulus switching. Brakerski, Gentry and Vaikuntanathan’s scheme further improved on
this by using a cryptosystem based on ring learning with errors (RLWE), and modifying
the techniques by Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan. This is done by generalizing the relin-
earization technique into something called key switching, and using modulus switching in
such a way that bootstrapping is not required. Brakerski’s scheme, based on LWE, used
an invariant perspective where modulus switching is not required, but the secret keys
used for key switching is larger than in Brakerski, Gentry and Vaikuntanathan’s scheme.
Finally, we saw Fan and Vercauteren’s scheme which used the ideas from Brakerski’s
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scheme but used the LPR encryption scheme based on RLWE, which proved to be more
efficient than Brakerski’s scheme.
Fully homomorphic encryption has many applications, and we have discussed some
of them that relate to other problems in cryptography. It is still far from practical, but
there are many paths that have not been fully explored in making improvements to the
existing schemes.
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